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Abstract 
This empirical paper explores knowledge outflow from MNC subsidiaries and its impact on the 
MNC performance. We develop and test hypotheses derived from literature on MNC knowledge 
flows integrated with the perspective of knowledge-creating, self-interested MNC subsidiaries. 
The hypotheses are developed using a simultaneous equation model applied to a unique dataset 
encompassing a German MNC, HeidelbergCement. Enablers and impediments of knowledge 
outflows are assessed in order to explain why subsidiaries share their knowledge with other 
MNC units. Implications are examined by studying the link between knowledge outflows and 
subsidiary performance. Our findings suggest that knowledge outflows increase a subsidiary’s 
performance only up to a certain point and that too much knowledge sharing may be detrimental 
to the contributing subsidiary’s performance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Knowledge transfer among subsidiaries provides opportunities to improve an MNC’s 
overall performance (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Kogut and Zander 1992; Szulanski 1996; Tsai 
and Ghoshal 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Foss and Pedersen 2002). However, only a 
few studies empirically examine knowledge flows between subsidiaries to determine the effect of 
various antecedents on knowledge sharing in MNCs (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000; Hansen 
1999; Holm and Pedersen 2000; Minbaeva et al. 2003). The literature suggests that subsidiaries 
benefit from knowledge inflows to a certain degree, which is determined by the receiving unit’s 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), the ability and 
motivation of subsidiary employees to use received knowledge (Minbaeva et al. 2003; Foss and 
Pedersen 2002), the type of knowledge transferred (Kogut and Zander 1993), and the presence of 
communication channels (Daft and Lengel 1986). In extension of these studies, this paper 
examines the antecedents and performance effects of knowledge outflows. While most previous 
work on this subject has looked at knowledge flows from the perspective of the receiving unit, 
this paper takes the perspective of the contributing subsidiary – the subsidiary that shares its 
knowledge with other MNC units. This approach allows us to study both the reasons why the 
contributing subsidiary shares its knowledge, and the performance effect of knowledge sharing. 
Our key questions are: Why do subsidiaries share their knowledge with other MNC units? and 
How does knowledge outflow affect a contributing subsidiary’s performance? 
The issue of why subsidiaries share their knowledge has been studied on the individual 
level (see Cabrera and Cabrera 2002). In those studies, knowledge sharing is conceptualized as a 
social dilemma in which individual rationality might lead to collective irrationality. However, to 
our knowledge there is no study exploring this issue within an MNC context to analyze the 
motivation of subsidiaries to share their knowledge with others. 
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Earlier studies on knowledge-sharing in the MNC usually focus on antecedents of 
knowledge sharing and assess the level of shared knowledge from the perspective of the 
receiving unit. While other studies just take subsidiaries’ willingness to share their knowledge 
with others as granted, the starting point for the current paper is that the motivation to engage in 
knowledge outflow is not a given. For a contributing subsidiary, sharing knowledge with other 
units may require time and resources, particularly if that knowledge is tacit and sticky, or if face-
to-face interaction is required for knowledge sharing (Von Hippel and Tyre 1994). In addition, 
given inter-subsidiary competition for reputation and resources, a contributing subsidiary’s 
managers might fear that other units will exploit shared knowledge, and therefore limit their 
engagement accordingly (Foss and Mahnke 2003; Mudambi and Navarra 2004). Applying the 
perspective of the contributing subsidiary provides insights into the enablers as well as the 
impediments of knowledge sharing. This also makes it possible to examine and endogenously 
explain why subsidiaries share their knowledge with other MNC units. 
With a few recent exceptions (such as Andersson et al. 2002; Mahnke et al. 2005), the 
relation between MNC knowledge flows and subsidiary performance remains largely an 
assertion and has not, for the most part, been empirically corroborated. The current paper offers 
an analysis of effects on the contributing subsidiary’s performance, as opposed to overall MNC 
performance or the performance of the receiving unit, and proposes that it may not always be in 
the best interest of a contributing unit to engage in knowledge outflows (Szulanski 1996; Gupta 
and Govindarajan 2000). In fact, we find the relationship between knowledge sharing and 
performance to be an inverted, U-shaped relation, indicating that some knowledge sharing will 
improve the contributing subsidiary’s performance, while too much knowledge sharing will have 
a negative impact on performance, as the cost of knowledge sharing exceed the benefits.  
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The contribution of this paper is four-fold: 1) While prior studies have restricted their 
analyses to antecedents of knowledge flows and neglected performance implications, this paper 
includes a direct test of the performance implications of knowledge outflows. 2) This paper 
explores the perspective of the contributing subsidiary, and 3) it introduces a model that treats a 
subsidiary’s motivation to engage in knowledge outflow as an endogenous construct determined 
by both enablers and impediments. Finally, 4) a unique data-set of individual perceptions of 
knowledge processes obtained from a single MNC – HeidelbergCement – is applied to test the 
entire model including antecedents (enablers and impediments), the intermediary steps 
(knowledge outflow) and the final outcome (subsidiary performance).   
 
SUBSIDIARY OBJECTIVES: SELF-INTEREST VS. MNC CITIZENSHIP   
 Recognizing the increasing role of MNC subsidiaries in knowledge creation, a number of 
authors report that subsidiary struggle s to bring locally-developed ideas and strategic drive to 
bear at the overall MNC level (Forsgren 1997; Rugman and Verbeke 2002). In this paper, we are 
concerned with antecedents to a subsidiary’s knowledge outflow. However, we do not take the 
willingness of subsidiaries to share their knowledge as a sign that the subsidiaries are good MNC 
citizens, but seek to explain this willingness through a contributing subsidiary’s self-interest.  
 Rather than restricting subsidiaries to the exploitation of knowledge developed in the 
MNC’s home base, MNCs have granted their subsidiaries mandates to assume geographic and 
product responsibilities to a large extent (see Frost 2001). Subsidiary roles within the MNC have 
shifted from home-base exploiting to home-base augmenting sites (Kuemmerle 1999), where 
knowledge is created in either centres of excellence (Holm and Pedersen 2000) or regional 
innovation centres (Asakawa and Lehrer 2003). Expanded subsidiary roles within the MNCs 
learning network enhances the overall learning and capability development of the MNC (Bartlett 
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and Ghoshal 1989; Birkinshaw and Morisson 1995). At the same time, however, changing 
subsidiary roles are accompanied by changing power relations in terms of the exchange of 
resources and knowledge between subsidiaries and headquarter (Asakawa 2001; Ferner et. al. 
2004; Mudambi and Navarra 2004).  
 Decision rights regarding the use of physical and financial resources remain ‘loaned’ from 
MCN headquarters, and are not ‘owned’ by the subsidiary (Foss and Foss 2002). However, 
decision rights with regards to knowledge outflows are hard for headquarters to control and, 
accordingly, knowledge sharing is hard to enforce. Therefore, subsidiaries might have substantial 
discretion over knowledge outflows when it comes to knowledge developed in a particular 
subsidiary location (see Mudambi and Navarra 2004). Thus, Holm and Pedersen (2000) suggest 
organization within the modern MNC might be viewed as a political game, where power and 
knowledge is increasingly distributed, and the clear hierarchical line of command, where 
knowledge and power are concentrated at the corporate headquarter, is disappearing. If control of 
key knowledge shifts in  favor of subsidiaries, the issues of why subsidiaries contribute  to the 
MNC through their knowledge outflows despite obvious impediments, and how alternative levels 
of knowledge outflows contribute to a subsidiary’s performance become all the more important.  
   For example, if a subsidiary is managed as a profit centre in order to keep the costs of 
performance monitoring and evaluation low, subsidiary autonomy is crucial (Williamson 1975). 
However, this may make a high degree of inter-subsidiary coordination and knowledge sharing 
detrimental to profit maximization within a focal subsidiary. Therefore, some authors 
recommend socialization and normative control to encourage good MNC citizen behavior and to 
stimulate knowledge sharing (Ouchi 1982; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 
1991, 2000). However, as long as financial performance measures are used to evaluate subsidiary 
managers, socialization and normative control may only encourage inter-subsidiary knowledge 
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sharing to a limited extent, and encouragement of knowledge sharing remains, at least in part, an 
inconceivable way to foster the commitment of contributing subsidiaries (Kreps 1990; Foss 
2003).  
 Finally, if knowledge is dispersed in the MNC, and knowledge gaps between the 
headquarters and its subsidiaries occur, the strategic alignment of subsidiary management 
becomes complicated (Mahnke and Venzin 2003). While the MNC head office may seek to 
directly encourage the sharing of crucial knowledge, large knowledge gaps between headquarter 
and subsidiaries might lead to ill-directed ‘selective interventions’ (Williamson 1996; Foss 
2003), which reduces a subsidiary managers’ autonomy as well as the reliability of the subsidiary 
profits as a performance measure (Holmström 1979). In addition, frequent intervention by  
headquarter invites subsidiary managers to engage in lobbying, which can raise the overall 
bargaining costs within the MNC (Milgrom and Roberts 1988).  In sum, subsidiaries can be 
expected to maximize their own performance when engaging in knowledge sharing activities, 
which might be at the expense of the MNC as a whole. 
 
DETERMINANTS OF SUBSIDIARY KNOWLEDGE OUTFLOW 
 From a subsidiary perspective, one can ask the following question: If valuable knowledge 
is a source of subsidiary bargaining power and there are impediments to knowledge sharing, why 
would a subsidiary share its knowledge with other units?  We argue that knowledge outflows  
decrease given a greater degree of tacitness in the subsidiary’s knowledge (Polanyi 1966; Kogut 
and Zander 1992; Pedersen et al. 2003), a greater fear of opportunistic rent appropriation by the 
receiving unit (Williamson 1996; Mudambi and Navarra 2004), or a lack of access to appropriate 
communication channels (e.g. Ghoshal et al. 1994; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000). On the other 
hand, subsidiaries might increase their knowledge outflows when they expect to benefit from 
 7
knowledge inflows from other subsidiaries. In that case, the credit assignment problems are 
solved by providing such incentives as acknowledgement and visibility (Foss and Mahnke 2003; 
Mahnke and Venzin 2003). In sum, both impediments, which are expected to decrease 
knowledge outflows, and enabling factors, which are expected to increase knowledge outflows, 
are at play. 
 
Impediments to knowledge outflows 
  As subsidiaries have different interests, budgets, and goals, knowledge outflows from an 
MNC subsidiary may be constrained due to fear of loosing a superior bargaining position 
(Forsgren 1997), or a lack of compensation for efforts associated with knowledge outflows 
(Szulanski 2003). Also, knowledge shared with other subsidiaries might be opportunistically 
exploited (Williamson 1996), as occurs when a subsidiary “free-rides” on others’ knowledge 
development efforts, takes undeserved credit, or misuses knowledge to lobby top management. 
Accordingly, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H1a: The greater the fear of opportunism, the lower the knowledge outflow from the focal 
subsidiary. 
 
 In addition, the resources and effort required by subsidiaries for the generation of 
knowledge outflows depend on the type of knowledge involved. For example, Forsgren (1997) 
notes that the more subsidiary knowledge creation is specific to the local context, the greater the 
difficulty in sharing that knowledge. By implication, the more location-specific a subsidiary’s 
knowledge is, the less it will be inclined (and asked) to share it, as the effort of providing the 
knowledge is too time-consuming and costly. When knowledge-sharing processes concern tacit 
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knowledge that is signified by substantial causal ambiguity and uncertainty (Simonin 1999), it 
requires time-consuming personal interaction (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Werr and Stjernberg 
2003). As a consequence, we propose: 
H1b: The more a subsidiary’s knowledge is tacit, the lower the knowledge outflow from the focal 
subsidiary. 
  
 Since transferring tacit knowledge is a complicated task, subsidiary managers may decide 
to codify knowledge and standardize knowledge exchange situations. These codification 
processes, however, are time consuming and, accordingly, may discourage a focal subsidiary’s 
knowledge outflow (Pedersen et al. 2003). As Cohen and Foray (1997:595) note, codification of 
knowledge is a costly process and includes “model building, language creation and the writing of 
messages.” These processes are performed, in practice, through brainstorming sessions, team 
discussions, and the exchange and writing of thoughts (Zollo and Winter 2002). Even if 
knowledge is codified, the ease of sharing it with other units depends on the availability and 
access of appropriate communication channels (Daft and Lengel 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000; Pedersen et. al. 2003). If appropriate communication channels are not available, non-trivial 
set-up costs might be incurred, including costs arising from technology investments, software, 
consultancy fees, and time required of managers and other employees. Therefore, we propose the 
following hypothesis: 
H1c: The less a subsidiary can use appropriate communication channels, the lower the 
knowledge outflow from the focal subsidiary. 
 
Enablers of knowledge outflows  
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 While there are impediments to a focal subsidiary’s knowledge outflow that discourage the 
sharing of knowledge even if it would benefit the MNC as a whole, there are several reasons that 
knowledge outflows are in the interest of the sharing subsidiary. For example, given the norms of 
reciprocity, a contributing subsidiary that is highly involved in sharing its knowledge with others 
will also be an active recipient of knowledge from other units (Kim and Mauborgne 1998). This 
builds on the argument that knowledge flows follow existing channels of communication. A 
subsidiary that frequently shares knowledge with its peers becomes part of the “in crowd” and is 
more likely to know which units have knowledge it needs. It also receives inflows of knowledge 
in return for its own knowledge outflows. However, this will only enhance innovation if the 
subsidiary maintains enough capacity to absorb external knowledge (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). In 
addition, knowledge inflows from other subsidiaries are an important part of a focal subsidiary’s 
learning process through which new opportunities are discovered (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998), 
absorptive capacity is augmented (Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Zahra and George 2002), and new 
competences may be developed by blending existing knowledge with new knowledge (Foss and 
Pedersen 2002). Therefore, we expect that: 
H2a:  The greater the knowledge inflow from other MNC units, the greater the knowledge 
outflow from the focal subsidiary. 
 
 Moreover, when subsidiary employees’ knowledge-sharing behavior can be specified, 
providing explicit informal acknowledgements can increase motivation, in particular if explicit 
acknowledgement acts as a complement rather than as a substitute for intrinsic motivation (Frey 
1997; Laursen and Mahnke 2001; Foss and Mahnke 2003). Informal acknowledgement may help 
intrinsic motivation without incurring the negative effects of misdirected extrinsic rewards and 
solves the credit assignment problem that would otherwise hamper knowledge outflows from a 
focal subsidiary. Benefits provided by headquarters and by other MNC units, such as 
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acknowledgement and visibility, positively influence a subsidiary’s knowledge outflow. 
Therefore, we propose:  
H2b:  The greater the acknowledgement from other MNC units, the greater the knowledge 
outflow from the focal subsidiary. 
 
 
PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE OUTFLOWS 
 It is argued here that while the focal subsidiary’s decision on knowledge sharing is 
determined by enablers and impediments, the actual act of engaging in knowledge sharing has 
implications for subsidiary performance. Knowledge outflows incur costs and benefits, thereby 
affecting subsidiary performance. 
  Sharing knowledge will often require interaction and meetings between different 
subsidiary employees, interactions which could otherwise be used for a subsidiary’s internal 
business and development activities (Pedersen et al. 2003). Thus, the opportunity costs of 
knowledge outflows might be substantial, especially when key subsidiary experts use their scarce 
time to disseminate knowledge instead of developing new competences or solving problems for 
the focal subsidiary (Forsgren et al. 2000). For whatever reason, knowledge outflows may 
become so taxing for a focal subsidiary that they encounter internal resource constraints, which 
may diminish and eventually crowd out a subsidiary’s own knowledge development. If, as a 
result, the absorptive capacity of the focal subsidiary decreases (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), 
knowledge inflows from other subsidiaries remain unused. Costs then increase while benefits 
decrease as a result of the subsidiary’s over-extension in knowledge sharing. 
In addition, as the amount of knowledge sharing increases, subsidiaries have to codify 
increasingly tacit knowledge. For example, while sharing available explicit knowledge with 
other subsidiaries may suffice in the beginning, the sharing of increasingly tacit knowledge will 
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increase marginal codification and sharing costs. Although codification processes have benefits 
in terms of learning about the contributing subsidiary’s processes (Nelson and Winter 1982), 
such learning might be subject to diminishing returns.  
Moreover, while knowledge inflows from other MNC units may encourage a subsidiary’s 
knowledge outflow because they trigger learning by combining internal and external knowledge, 
receiving too much knowledge from other units may overburden subsidiary managers with 
knowledge that they cannot absorb. This may particularly be the case when subsidiary managers 
are cognitively focused on teaching others rather than learning themselves. 
We expect that knowledge outflows will improve business performance up to a certain 
point, at which returns to increasing knowledge outflows begin to diminish and eventually 
become negative. Therefore, we propose a curve linear relationship (inverse U-shaped) between 
the outflow of knowledge and subsidiary performance, where increasing knowledge outflow will 
have a positive impact on performance up to a certain point. As soon as the amount of shared 
knowledge increases beyond this point the direct costs and opportunity costs will result in a 
negative relationship between knowledge outflow and performance. Accordingly, we expect: 
  H3:  Knowledge outflows are first positively and then negatively related to a contributing 
subsidiary’s performance (inverse U-shaped relationship). 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
The research was conducted in a German cement company, HeidelbergCement. With 
operations in more than 40 countries, worldwide sales of over 6 billion Euro and 38,000 
employees, HeidelbergCement is one of the four largest cement manufacturers in the world. 
During our study, the company entered a consolidation phase following a rapid expansion. 
HeidelbergCement grew from less than 10,000 employees to its current size in less than ten 
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years, mainly through acquisitions. One objective for the gradual integration of the newly 
acquired companies was to increase knowledge exchange between the different units.  
Although using a one company sample has disadvantages in terms of the generalizability 
of results across sectors, it has advantages in terms of controlling for contextual factors that 
complicate the interpretation of results in multiple-firm samples (such as variations in industry 
and firm-specific factors). In addition, previous research has successfully used single firm 
sampling to explore the effects of intra-firm networks on resource exchange and combination 
(see Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). We decided to limit our survey to one company, which allows us to 
include more informants from each subsidiary. This is an advantage compared to most other 
studies that only include a single informant from each organization (typically the CEO) and treat 
the perception of this informant as representative of the whole organization (see Lane and 
Lubatkin 1998; Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).      
We developed a questionnaire based on a literature review and 52 on-site interviews with 
senior managers of the 6 business units of HeidelbergCement. The interviews ranged from one to 
four hours in length. Ten senior managers were asked to complete the survey as a pilot run to 
increase the clarity of the questions and avoid interpretation errors. We discussed the face 
validity of the questions, which resulted in several substantial changes in the phrasing of the 
questions to avoid technical management terms. Following the survey pre-testing, we identified a 
sample of 265 MNC unit managers stemming from all geographical business areas of 
HeidelbergCement. The selected managers represented three distinct groups: the first included 
100 managers that had either been previously interviewed by our research team and/or 
participated in one of the international knowledge management workshops aiming at designing 
the HeidelbergCement knowledge management system. The second group consisted of 100 
managers that had not been interviewed and did not participate in knowledge management 
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workshops. The third group included 65 engineers from the subsidiaries who presented the views 
of the employees who are most directly involved in international day-to-day knowledge transfer.  
The questionnaire was sent out in hard copy together with a six-page brochure explaining 
the scope of the knowledge management initiatives at HeidelbergCement as well as a letter from 
the CEO supporting the survey. Participants had four weeks to return the questionnaire via mail 
or fax. This mailing process was managed by headquarters, but respondents were assured of 
confidentiality and their identity was concealed. We collected 222 usable questionnaires, giving 
a response rate of 83.77%.  
The data was collected on the individual manager level although most of the survey 
questions referred to the subsidiary level, which in the case of HeidelbergCement is equal to an 
operational unit on the country level. We obtained responses from 20 different subsidiaries and 
got multiple responses from all subsidiaries except for one, requiring us to deal with the 
interrater reliability among respondents belonging to the same subsidiary.   
 
MEASURES 
All data were collected through the questionnaire and most variables are multi-item 
measures that were measured using seven-point Likert scales. However, items such as the 
number of employees were measured using actual values. The following sections provide 
information on the questionnaire items. 
Financial performance. Several researchers have used perceptual measures of 
performance as opposed to more objective performance measures (such as return on equity), as 
objective measures mainly capture past performance (see Andersson et al. 2001). Perceptual 
measures have also shown a tendency to have a high correlation with objective accounting-based 
 14
measures (Geringer and Hebert 1991). Accordingly, we apply a perceptual measure of 
performance, where respondents were asked to indicate their perception of the subsidiary’s 
performance. Respondents indicated their perception of the two items revenues and cost savings 
using a Likert scale (1=low, 7=very high). Financial performance was then calculated as the 
average score reported by respondents across these two items (Alpha=0.72).  
 Tacitness of knowledge. This construct expresses the level of tacitness of the knowledge 
in the focal subsidiary. Knowledge tacitness was measured by asking the respondents to assess to 
the following two statements “Large parts of knowledge in our unit are located in the heads of 
single individuals” and “Knowledge is extensively documented and well structured” (reverse 
coded) on a seven-point Likert scale (1=don’t agree, 7=strongly agree). Tacitness was calculated 
as the average score for these two items (Alpha=0.76). 
 Communication channel. The construct captures the extent to which inexpensive and 
appropriate communication channels are in place for the transfer of knowledge to other MNC 
units. The assumption is that the face-to-face sharing of knowledge is the most simple transfer 
mechanism, but it is also very time consuming and requires intensive involvement on both ends 
(Pedersen et al. 2003). Therefore, on one end of the scale we have resource demanding face-to-
face transfer of knowledge and, on the other end, we have more routine and less demanding 
transfer mechanisms like intranets and databases. This construct was measured by asking 
respondents whether “Requesters contact us face to face” and “Requesters contact us via intranet 
or phone” (reverse coded) on a seven-point Likert scale (1=never, 7=always). The two items 
were added together and the average of the two items made up our communication channel 
construct (Alpha=0.74). 
Fear of opportunism. The construct fear of opportunism captures the extent to which the 
respondents fear that others will behave opportunistically when knowledge is transferred. The 
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construct was measured by asking respondents to assess the following statement in terms of 
knowledge outflows to other MNC units: “I fear that they will steal our ideas” on a seven-point 
Likert scale (1=never, 7=always).  
 Acknowledgement of knowledge. The construct acknowledgement of knowledge 
captures the extent to which the focal subsidiary’s knowledge is formally or informally 
acknowledged by other MNC units. This was measured by asking respondents to assess the 
extent to which “Knowledge represented in your unit is (formally/informally) acknowledged by 
other organizational units” on a seven-point Likert scale (1=not at all, 7=to a high degree). An 
average score was calculated for the two items (Alpha=0.86).  
Inflow of knowledge. The construct Inflow of knowledge captures the extent of 
knowledge inflow from other HeidelbergCement units to the focal unit. The construct was 
measured in line with other studies on knowledge flows in MNCs (Holm and Pedersen 2000) by 
asking respondents to assess to what extent knowledge represented in other units influences their 
work (1=not at all, 7=very strongly). 
 Outflow of knowledge. This construct expresses the extent of outflow of knowledge from 
the focal unit to other units in HeidelbergCement. The construct was measured by asking 
respondents to assess to what extent knowledge represented in their units influences work in 
other units (1=not at all, 7=very strongly).  
 Both outflows and inflows of knowledge are measured as their influence on work in other 
units, which implies that knowledge is only fully shared when it is utilized and has an impact on 
another unit.  
 Controls. A number of control variables were added that are expected to have an impact 
on the outflow of knowledge as well as financial performance. One control variable is 
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technological development, which is a binary variable expressing whether the particular 
subsidiary is involved in technological development (coded 1 if involved and 0 if not). We also 
control for others dependency, which is the extent to which other MNC units are dependent on 
the focal unit’s knowledge (measured as a single item construct on a seven-point Likert scale 
where 1=not at all, 7=to a high degree). The assumption is that subsidiaries conducting 
technological development and/or subsidiaries on which other units depend for knowledge will 
have a potentially higher outflow of knowledge and be able to reap the benefits of knowledge 
outflows.  
 The potential personal bias among respondents is controlled for by adding a dummy 
variable indicating whether the respondent has been involved in the design of the Knowledge 
Management Program in HeidelbergCement, meaning that they have participated in the 
knowledge management workshops. Those involved in the design of the program may be more 
positive in their perception of knowledge management initiatives than others. 
Since the data were collected on the individual manager level and since, on average, 11 
managers responded for each subsidiary, we have the potential problem of interrater reliability. 
For example,  the perception of subsidiary performance might vary between managers belonging 
to the same subsidiary. Therefore, we applied the Cohen’s kappa statistics to the different 
measures. The Cohen’s kappa statistics are designed to estimate the degree of consensus between 
managers belonging to the same subsidiary after correcting for the amount of agreement that 
could be expected by chance alone. Landis and Koch (1977) suggest that kappa values from 
0.41-0.60 are moderate, and that values above 0.60 indicate a substantial degree of agreement. 
All the measures included in the models reached a kappa value above 0.60 except for the 
measure on opportunism, which has a kappa value of 0.48. This is still acceptable and much 
higher than the level of agreement that could be expected by chance (kappa= 0).  
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 In order to control for the fact that some individual respondents are belonging to the same 
subsidiary, we added dummies for each subsidiary. The 222 usable observations represent 20 
different subsidiaries. Since respondents from the same subsidiary obviously share the same 
organizational context, we cannot treat these observations as completely independent of each 
other. In order to control for this aspect, we have added a dummy for each subsidiary (except the 
base case = Germany). Furthermore, as discussed by Delmestri and Walgenbach (2005), middle 
managers may play very different roles in the different countries in relation to knowledge 
processes. The different roles might affect the perception of the involved managers, which is 
another reason for including the subsidiary dummies to control for systematic biases in the 
perceptions of subsidiary managers.     
 
Results 
The hypotheses may be summarized in two equations as follows.  
1) Outflow of knowledge   =  ƒ (Opportunism, Tacitness, Communication channels, Inflow of 
knowledge, Acknowledgement, Controls) + Error 
2) Financial performance =  g (Outflow of knowledge, Outflow of knowledge squared, 
Controls) + Error 
 
As proposed in hypotheses 1a-1c, we expect all the three impediments (opportunism, 
tacitness and communication channels) to be negatively related to the outflow of knowledge, 
while the two enablers (inflow of knowledge and acknowledgement) are expected to show a 
positive coefficient in equation 1 (hypotheses 2a and 2b). In order to test hypothesis 3 on the 
curve-linear relationship, we have added both the outflow of knowledge (first order) and the 
outflow of knowledge squared (second order), where the first order variable is expected to be 
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positive and the second order variable expected to be negative with an inverse U relationship 
between knowledge outflow and performance.      
However, since the above models represent factors that are interdependent and must be 
considered jointly, the use of single equation models may yield biased results and obscure 
interesting theoretical possibilities.  As the above equations are interdependent, the joint 
optimization of all involved variables may lead to the sub-optimization of one or more individual 
variables. Statistically, the interdependence might be evident if the error terms of the two 
equations are somehow correlated. Hence, the correct model to estimate these decisions is a 
simultaneous equation model -- a three-stage, least square model circumvents the problem of 
interdependence by using instrumental variables (often the exogenous variables) to obtain the 
predicted values of the endogenous variables (knowledge outflow and financial performance in 
our case). 
 The correlation matrix (including all correlation coefficients) and the descriptive data 
(mean values, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values) for all variables in the model 
are provided by Appendix 1. In order to detect potential problems of multicollinearity, we should 
look at correlation coefficients among the model’s independent variables. None of these are 
above the threshold that usually indicates the possibility of multicollinearity (r>0.5), (Hair et al. 
1995). Therefore, we conclude that the results are very stable in terms of the different 
specifications of the model and that the data does not seem to include problems of 
multicollinearity.   
  We have applied the three-stage least square regression techniques (3SLS) with 
instrumental variables to test all hypotheses simultaneously. The result of the total model is 
given in Table 1, where the numbers in parentheses represent standard errors. 
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 Overall, the system of the two equations (models) works well, with a system weighted R-
square of 0.44. This indicates that almost half of the observed variation in the contributing 
subsidiary’s performance is explained by the variables in the model.  
The Hausman test (comparing the OLS model with the 3SLS model) confirms that our 
specification of knowledge outflow and subsidiary performance as endogenously determined 
(3SLS) is superior to the OLS model. In fact, the value of the Hausman specification test 
comparing the OLS and 3SLS of 43.31 (p < 0.001) indicates that the model where the level of 
knowledge outflow is determined endogenously (by the enablers and impediments) gives far 
better estimates for knowledge outflows and subsidiary performance than two separate OLS 
models. This gives further evidence to the claim that the level of knowledge outflows cannot be 
assumed to be an exogenous variable, but needs to be determined endogenously in the model. 
**** Insert Table 1 about here **** 
 
 As shown in Table 1, the two impediments of knowledge tacitness (p < 0.10) and 
communication channels (p < 0.01) have a significantly negative impact on the outflow of 
knowledge from the focal unit. However, the fear of opportunism has the expected negative 
coefficient, but is insignificant. The results indicate that the main impediments associated with 
the outflow of knowledge are those required to establish appropriate communication channels 
and codify knowledge, while fear of opportunism is of minor importance among MNC units. 
 Both enablers have, as expected, positive coefficients and are highly significant. With a 
coefficient of 0.46, the inflow of knowledge (p < 0.01) is a particular strong facilitator of 
knowledge outflow, which indicates that knowledge flows are a reciprocal game to a large 
extent. A subsidiary’s own knowledge is shared with the expectation that it will then have access 
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to another unit’s knowledge. The same is true for the acknowledgement of knowledge (p < 0.05), 
which positively facilitates the outflow of knowledge, but to a lesser extent. The results indicate 
that the benefits of transferring knowledge to other units are related to reputation and 
appreciation (acknowledgement), and to obtaining access to continuous knowledge sharing. 
These are more positional advantages, reflecting the focal subsidiary’s position within the 
knowledge sharing network.  
 Furthermore, as expected, the outflow of knowledge has a strong positive impact (p < 
0.01) on the financial performance of the subsidiary. However, the positive impact only lasts to a 
certain point indicated by the negative impact of outflow of knowledge squared. This result 
strongly supports hypothesis 3 that an inverse U-shaped relationship exists between knowledge 
outflow and performance. The implication is that for low levels of knowledge outflow, 
knowledge sharing with other units improves the focal unit’s financial performance. At a certain 
point, however, the marginal costs of further knowledge sharing increase and the benefits  
diminish so that knowledge sharing has a negative impact on performance. These results remain 
the same when controlling for technological development, dependency on others, involvement in 
design and subsidiary dummies (the two first turned out to be significant in themselves).  
 The advantage of the model is that it establishes a link between the decision to engaging in 
knowledge outflows and the performance outcome of different levels of knowledge sharing. By 
doing that we have been able to identify the drivers of knowledge sharing among subsidiaries 
which is rarely discussed in the literature and to point out that knowledge sharing may not 
always be beneficial for the contributing subsidiary.     
 
DISCUSSION 
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 Why do MNC subsidiaries engage in knowledge sharing with other subsidiaries and what 
are the implications for performance? This research suggests that a subsidiary’s willingness to 
engage in knowledge outflow depends on enablers of as well as impediments to knowledge 
outflows. The main impediments are lack of appropriate communication channels and, to a lesser 
extent, the tacitness of knowledge, while the main enablers are the reciprocal inflow of 
knowledge and the acknowledgement of unique subsidiary knowledge. Our research shows a 
significant inverse U-shape relation between knowledge outflows and performance, indicating 
that subsidiaries may increase performance by increasing knowledge outflows until a point is 
reached where increasing marginal costs and diminishing benefits indicate a performance penalty 
for subsidiaries, which share more knowledge than is good for their performance. 
 A self-interested subsidiary within the MNC shares knowledge with other units to the 
extent that it expects benefits greater than costs. Engaging in knowledge outflows allows a 
subsidiary to receive reciprocal knowledge inflows from other units that, if effectively applied, 
contribute to the focal subsidiary’s performance. This research finds that knowledge inflows 
significantly affect knowledge outflows both because knowledge inflows are an input for 
knowledge outflows and because the subsidiaries are engaged in a reciprocal game where 
knowledge providers gain knowledge from other MNC units. In addition, MNC headquarters’ 
acknowledgement of valuable subsidiary knowledge significantly increases the subsidiary’s 
propensity to share knowledge with other units. Reputation gained might also contribute to a 
subsidiary’s participation in knowledge sharing as it can aid in lobbying decision makers and 
acquiring favorable positions in the MNC’s fund allocation process. Our results also suggest that 
tacitness of knowledge and lack of access to appropriate communication channels act as 
disincentives knowledge sharing among self-interested subsidiaries. Thus, our findings support 
prior research on determinants of MNC internal knowledge flows (Tsai and Ghoshal 1998, Gupta 
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and Govindarajan 2000; Minbaeva et al. 2003; Foss and Pedersen 2003) and extend this stream 
of research by focusing on the perspective of the contributing subsidiary.  
 These results make a significant contribution to current research on subsidiary knowledge 
sharing behavior, given that improving business performance is one of the most important 
objectives for subsidiaries in large, complex organizations such as an MNC. We show that 
knowledge outflows are not only in the interest of the MNC as a whole, but also benefit the self-
interested subsidiary. While prior studies have restricted their analyses to antecedents of 
knowledge flows in terms of shared knowledge and neglected the performance implications, this 
paper contributes a direct test of the performance implications of knowledge outflows. With 
regard to methodology, a unique data set encompassing individual perceptions of knowledge 
processes from one MNC – HeidelbergCement – is applied to test the entire model, including 
antecedents (enablers and impediments), the intermediary steps (knowledge outflows) and the 
final outcome (subsidiary performance). This research shows that knowledge outflows 
significantly affect a subsidiary’s performance, as indicated by the inverted U-shape.  
 This finding is interesting given that previous research has focused on the effect of 
antecedents to knowledge outflows without addressing how increased levels of knowledge 
outflows influence subsidiary performance. A central assumption of knowledge sharing research 
is that increased knowledge sharing benefits the MNC as a whole (see Gupta and Govindarajan 
2000). However, our findings indicate an inverse U-shaped relation between knowledge outflow 
and subsidiary performance. We have explained this finding with reference to (a) decreasing 
benefits and increasing costs of knowledge sharing while creating more appropriate 
communication channels and codifying knowledge to make higher levels of knowledge outflows 
possible, and (b) diminishing returns to increasing levels of knowledge inflows that cannot be 
absorbed (see Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Other explanations may be possible. Thus, future 
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research may investigate the U-shaped relation between performance and subsidiary knowledge 
outflows by empirically addressing alternative reasons.   
 Our findings on the knowledge outflow/performance relation raise a red flag with regard to 
the assumption that knowledge sharing is always beneficial for the subsidiary and the MNC as a 
whole. As soon as knowledge outflows from a focal subsidiary exceed a certain point, the 
subsidiary incurs performance penalties. By implication, for the “more knowledge sharing is  
good” assumption to hold at the MNC level, the benefits of knowledge inflows in other 
subsidiaries must overcompensate for performance penalties incurred by contributing 
subsidiaries that share too much knowledge. Increasing the level of knowledge sharing can be 
detrimental to performance on both the subsidiary and MNC levels. Although previous research 
indicated how to increase levels of shared knowledge by removing impediments to knowledge 
sharing (see Szulanski 2003; Michailova and Husted 2003), there is little systematic 
understanding of how to optimize levels of knowledge sharing with regards to increasing 
performance on both the subsidiary and MNC levels. Future studies could further explore this 
issue.  
 Interesting results may also arise from an examination of why self-interested subsidiaries 
share more knowledge than is good for their performance. Our findings indicate that subsidiaries 
increase knowledge outflows in response to perceived dependence on other subsidiaries. Thus, 
despite possible negative effects on the subsidiary’s performance, a subsidiary’s knowledge 
sharing might be motivated by attempts to signal good citizen behavior and to comply with 
knowledge sharing norms. Another interesting explanation that could be addressed in future 
research relates to the career-seeking behavior of subsidiary managers who share knowledge to 
increase their personal reputation at the cost of their subsidiary’s performance. Future research 
 24
pursuing this line of inquiry has the potential to make significant contributions to management 
research in general and to research on knowledge processes in the MNC in particular.  
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Table 1: The three-stage least squares estimation of a simultaneous equation model (N=222). 
  
Outflow of 
knowledge 
 
 
Financial  
performance 
Intercept 0.45 
(0.63) 
-5.32 
(4.06) 
Tacitness of knowledge  
 
-0.11* 
(0.06) 
 
Fear of opportunism  
 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
 
Communication channels 
 
-0.23*** 
(0.09) 
 
Inflow of knowledge  
 
0.46*** 
(0.07) 
 
Acknowledgement of knowledge  
 
0.18** 
(0.07) 
 
Outflow of knowledge   3.47*** 
(1.21) 
Outflow of knowledge squared  -0.65*** 
(0.19) 
Technological development 
 
0.02 
(0.17) 
0.54** 
(0.21) 
Others dependency  0.30*** 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.06) 
Involved in design of KM tools 
 
0.16 
(0.16) 
-0.19 
(0.16) 
Subsidiary dummies1 
 
Yes Yes 
7.39*** 
0.38 
1.83** 
0.06 
0.44 
F-value 
Adj. R-square 
System weighted R-square 
Hausman's test comparing OLS to 3SLS 43.31 (df =38) *** 
***, ** and * = significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 1 The model includes 20 dummies – one 
for each subsidiary, however, the parameters are not shown    
Appendix 1. Correlation matrix for all variables included in the model (N=222) 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11  
 
 
1) Tacitness of knowledge 1.00  
 
2) Fear of opportunism -0.12* 1.00 
 
3) Communication channels  0.09 -0.05 1.00 
 
4) Inflow of knowledge -0.20*** -0.09 -0.11 1.00 
 
5) Acknowledgement of knowledge -0.24*** 0.04 -0.10 0.26 1.00 
 
6) Technological development 0.07 0.04 -0.01 0.08 0.07 1.00 
 
7) Others dependency  -0.20*** -0.02 -0.17** 0.04 0.08 0.18*** 1.00 
 
8) Involved in design of KM tools 0.04 0.07 -0.13** 0.09 0.08 -0.04 0.03 1.00 
 
9) Outflow of knowledge  -0.20*** -0.10 -0.21*** 0.48*** 0.29*** 0.16** 0.39*** 0.13* 1.00 
 
10) Outflow of knowledge squared -0.19*** -0.10 -0.19*** 0.49*** 0.30*** 0.18*** 0.39*** 0.13* 0.98*** 1.00 
 
11) Financial performance -0.13* -0.09 -0.17** 0.25*** 0.10 0.10 0.15** -0.09 0.24*** 0.22*** 1.00 
 
Mean   3.33 1.74 4.66 5.02 4.57 0.40 3.75 0.34 4.94 26.2 5.08  
Std. Dev.  1.18 1.06 0.91 1.18 1.13 0.49 1.41 0.47 1.34 12.3 0.72  
 
Min. values  1  1 2 2 1.5 0 1 0 1 1 2.75  
Max values  6 7 7 7 7 1 7 1 7 49  7 
 
***, ** and * indicates 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, respectively 
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